Stability of Mixed-Strategy-Based Iterative Logit Quantal Response Dynamics in Game Theory

Qian Zhuang, Zengru Di and Jinshan Wu

PLOS ONE, 2014, vol. 9, issue 8, 1-16

Abstract: Using the Logit quantal response form as the response function in each step, the original definition of static quantal response equilibrium (QRE) is extended into an iterative evolution process. QREs remain as the fixed points of the dynamic process. However, depending on whether such fixed points are the long-term solutions of the dynamic process, they can be classified into stable (SQREs) and unstable (USQREs) equilibriums. This extension resembles the extension from static Nash equilibriums (NEs) to evolutionary stable solutions in the framework of evolutionary game theory. The relation between SQREs and other solution concepts of games, including NEs and QREs, is discussed. Using experimental data from other published papers, we perform a preliminary comparison between SQREs, NEs, QREs and the observed behavioral outcomes of those experiments. For certain games, we determine that SQREs have better predictive power than QREs and NEs.

Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:plo:pone00:0105391

DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0105391

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