Optimal Cooperation-Trap Strategies for the Iterated Rock-Paper-Scissors Game

Zedong Bi and Hai-Jun Zhou

PLOS ONE, 2014, vol. 9, issue 10, 1-6

Abstract: In an iterated non-cooperative game, if all the players act to maximize their individual accumulated payoff, the system as a whole usually converges to a Nash equilibrium that poorly benefits any player. Here we show that such an undesirable destiny is avoidable in an iterated Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) game involving two rational players, X and Y. Player X has the option of proactively adopting a cooperation-trap strategy, which enforces complete cooperation from the rational player Y and leads to a highly beneficial and maximally fair situation to both players. That maximal degree of cooperation is achievable in such a competitive system with cyclic dominance of actions may stimulate further theoretical and empirical studies on how to resolve conflicts and enhance cooperation in human societies.

Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:plo:pone00:0111278

DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0111278

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