Cooperation enhanced by the coevolution of teaching activity in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games with voluntary participation

Chen Shen, Chen Chu, Yini Geng, Jiahua Jin, Fei Chen and Lei Shi

PLOS ONE, 2018, vol. 13, issue 2, 1-8

Abstract: Voluntary participation, as an additional strategy involved in repeated games, has been proved to be an efficient way to promote the evolution of cooperation theoretically and empirically. Besides, current studies show that the coevolution of teaching activity can promote cooperation. Thus, inspired by aforementioned above, we investigate the effect of coevolution of teaching activity on the evolution of cooperation for prisoner’s dilemma game with voluntary participation: when the focal player successfully enforces its strategy on the opponent, his teaching ability will get an increase. Through numerical simulation, we have shown that voluntary participation could effectively promote the fraction of cooperation, which is also affected by the value of increment. Furthermore, we investigate the influence of the increment value on the density of different strategies and find that there exists an optimal increment value that plays an utmost role on the evolutionary dynamics. With regard to this observation, we unveil that an optimal value of increment can lead to strongest heterogeneity in agents’ teaching ability, further promoting the evolution of cooperation.

Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:plo:pone00:0193151

DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0193151

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