An evolutionary game-theoretic analysis of the "multi-agent co-governance" system of unfair competition on internet platforms

Zhen Xu and Shudan Zheng

PLOS ONE, 2024, vol. 19, issue 6, 1-29

Abstract: The increasingly prominent issue of unfair competition on Internet platforms (IPUC) severely restricts the healthy and sustainable development of the platform economy. Based on the IPUC "multi-agent co-governance" scenario, this paper introduces stochastic disturbances and continuous strategy set to improve the classical binary deterministic evolutionary game system. The results show that after considering stochastic disturbances, the positive state corresponding to the equilibrium point (1,1) is no longer stable, and the required parameter conditions are more stringent. The IPUC "multi-agent co-governance" system under stochastic disturbances exhibits specific vulnerability. In the continuous strategy set evolutionary game system, government departments and Internet platforms can flexibly make optimal decisions based on maximizing expected returns, and strategy selection has better elasticity. Regardless of the evolutionary game scenario, maintaining the participation level of NGOs and the public above a certain threshold while increasing the penalty intensity is conducive to the evolution of the game system toward the positive state. The analysis process and conclusions provide insights and guidance for the governments to design the IPUC regulatory system and frameworks.

Date: 2024
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0304445 (text/html)
https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/file?id= ... 04445&type=printable (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:plo:pone00:0304445

DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0304445

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in PLOS ONE from Public Library of Science
Bibliographic data for series maintained by plosone ().