Risco moral e seleção adversa na intermediação financeira no mercado de crédito

Moral risk and adverse selection in financial intermediation in the credit market

Antonio Alfazema () and Eduardo Filippi

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Abstract The purpose of the article is to discuss moral hazard and adverse selection in financial intermediation in the credit market. Moral risk and adverse selection are fundamental concepts for understanding the operation of the financial intermediation process in the credit market, which is very important for a country's financial system. With the advent of globalization, markets are showing an increase in capital flows, providing more efficient allocations, through better intermediation, restructuring the forms of transactions with more security and transparency. It is important to note that technological and financial system development are mutually stimulating, thereby avoiding moral hazard and consequently adverse selection. The study finds that credit risk stems from a debtor's lack of performance, which may be the result of his own disability or unwillingness. The quality of information assumes a prominent place in the economic and financial analysis of the client company.

Keywords: Key words: Moral hazard; Adverse Selection; Financial intermediation; Credit. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-08-13
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/102393/1/MPRA_paper_102393.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:102393

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().