EU regulation and open market share repurchases: New evidence
Angeliki Drousia,
Athanasios Episcopos,
George Leledakis and
Emmanuil Pyrgiotakis
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
Abstract:
This paper re-examines the impact of the EU Market Abuse Directive (MAD) on the market reaction around share repurchase announcements. We use a unique hand-collected dataset of firms listed on the Athens Stock Exchange, and we find evidence that contrasts with previous conclusions for large European economies. The implementation of the MAD is followed by a significant increase in announcement abnormal returns, which is more pronounced in initial repurchase programs. Our results remain robust to a series of robustness tests. We attribute our findings to cross-country differences in institutional framework and pre-MAD existing national laws. Collectively, our results support the notion that EU directives do not have a uniform effect across Member States. Thus, the impact of such reforms should also be examined in individual capital market studies.
Keywords: Share repurchases; Market Abuse Directive; safe harbor; signaling undervaluation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G14 G15 G35 G38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-06-01, Revised 2021-01-31
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/105683/1/MPRA_paper_105683.pdf original version (application/pdf)
Related works:
Working Paper: EU regulation and open market share repurchases: New evidence (2020) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:105683
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().