A Nash equilibrium against gun control

Alessandro Saccal

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This work constructs a non-cooperative, static game of gun control between the citizen and a pacifistic society characterised by law enforcement imperfection, by which the retention of firearms and the certitude of punishment against all crimes emerges both as a strict Nash equilibrium, in pure strategies, and as a strict dominant strategy equilibrium. The reason is that ratified by the Second Amendment to the American Constitution, discerning the necessity of a militia to the individual and societal security of a free state, by which the right of the people to keep and bear arms cannot be infringed.

Keywords: citizen; criminal; equilibrium; felon; game; guns; mass murderer; payoff; punishment; society; suicide. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D74 K14 K39 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-10-31
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-law
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:115213

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