Navigating the Paradox of Democracy and Military Control: An Analysis of an Imaginary Country's Political Landscape

Khalid Zaman

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The rise of a military-led "deep state" is a global phenomenon that seriously threatens democratic governments everywhere. A hypothetical nation called "Sherwan" has a military-led "deep state" that controls the government, the economy, and the media. The military maintains its grip on power through a convoluted system of manipulation and compulsion, all while hiding its true nature behind the facade of democratic institutions. A combination of the military's dominance of political parties and the election process and the government's efforts to silence the media and civil society have made it difficult for the country's citizens to have confidence in the democratic system. There is no possibility of enforcing responsibility or monitoring, allowing the military-led deep state to function without restraint. The military's obsession with its preservation slows economic growth by diverting resources from defence and undercutting free-market ideals. This research delves into the numerous facets of the military-led deep state. It considers potential responses to the threats it presents to democratic governance, open government, and the rule of law. This research, which uses the made-up nation of Sherwan as an example, sheds light on the workings of a military-led deep state and offers suggestions for combating it to promote freer, more democratic societies.

Keywords: Military-led deep state; Fantasy country; Conspiracy theories; Power game; Challenges; Solutions. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-01-11, Revised 2023-02-14
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Published in Politica 1.1(2023): pp. 26-32

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:116366

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