Response to "A note on Brandl and Brandt's axiomatic characterization of Nash equilibrium"

Florian Brandl and Felix Brandt

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Schroeder (2025) claims that the solution concept, which, for each n-player game, returns the set of all strategy profiles where each player's strategy has full support, constitutes a counter-example to the characterization by Brandl and Brandt (2024). We show that this is not true because this solution concept violates consequentialism.

Keywords: Nash equilibrium; axiomatic characterization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-01-14
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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