Coalitional substitution of players and the proportional Shapley value

Manfred Besner

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We present a new axiomatization of the proportional Shapley value. Our study is based on three axioms: efficiency, which ensures that the total worth of the grand coalition is fully distributed among the players; the disjointly productive players property, which states that removing a player who has no cooperative interactions with another player does not affect that player's payoff; and a new axiom that makes the difference to the classical Shapley value. This axiom, the coalitional substitution of players property, involves a scenario in which a player's cooperative contribution to one coalition is replaced by that of a group of new players whose combined individual worths match that of the original player. The key point is that the payoffs to the remaining players remain unaffected.

Keywords: Cooperative game; Proportional Shapley value; Disjointly productive players; Coalitional substitution of players; Patronage refunds (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D60 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-02-19
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-spo
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