Monopolistic Licensing Strategies under Asymmetric Information

Patrick Schmitz

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Consider a research lab that owns a patent on a new technology but cannot develop a marketable final product based on the new technology. There are two downstream firms that might successfully develop the new product. If the downstream firms' benefits from being the sole supplier of the new product are private information, the research lab will sometimes sell two licences, even though under complete information it would have sold one exclusive licence. This is in contrast to the standard result that a monopolist will sometimes serve less, but never more buyers when there is private information.

Keywords: Licences; Innovation; Monopoly; Private information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D45 L12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (28)

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Related works:
Journal Article: On Monopolistic Licensing Strategies under Asymmetric Information (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:12532

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