Institutionalization and Institutional Evolution: A Model of Selecting Government Officials in Ancient China

Haiwen Zhou

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Evolution of institutions in selecting government officials in ancient China reflected efficiency considerations and increased power concentration in the hands of the ruler. Selecting government officials in ancient China became more rule-based over time, and standardization and centralization were some key features of this process. In this dynamic model, a higher volume of transactions shown as the number of candidates needed to be evaluated leads to institutionalization which has a higher fixed cost but a lower marginal cost in processing each transaction. In the steady state, a ruler with a more encompassing interest chooses a higher level of institutionalization. The impact of a change in the level of elite power on the level of institutionalization is sensitive to the relative power of state versus society.

Keywords: Institutionalization; institutional evolution; rule-based governance; Chinese history; political economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: N45 O53 P40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-10-22
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cna
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