Sleeping with the Enemy: A General Equilibrium Approach

Paulo Roberto Amorim Loureiro

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper develops a general equilibrium model of domestic violence grounded in household bargaining and economic dependence. Inspired by the dynamics portrayed in the film *Sleeping with the Enemy* (1991), the model incorporates exit constraints, enforcement, and social norms as determinants of women’s decisions regarding labor participation and relationship continuity. The analysis shows how insufficient enforcement and limited outside opportunities trap victims in stable but inefficient equilibria characterized by violence and dependency. Comparative statics demonstrate that welfare policies such as shelters, transfers, and employment support shift equilibrium outcomes toward safety and self-sufficiency. The results highlight the role of public intervention in restoring efficiency and individual autonomy when private bargaining fails due to asymmetric power and coercion.

Keywords: Domestic Violence; Economic Dependence; Household Bargaining; Enforcement; Welfare Policy; Gender Economics; Exit Constraints; Social Norms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D13 I38 J12 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-08-07
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:126612

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