Cross Dominance: A Shared-Interest Parallel to Strict Dominance

Shiko Kudo

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We describe cross dominance, a bilateral strengthening of weak dominance: switching B->A is never worse for either player. Cross dominance is strictly stronger than weak dominance yet orthogonal to strict dominance; within the Pareto-monotone slice we have SD => CD => WD. This yields a shared-interest ladder (weak -> cross -> strict-cross) that runs in parallel to the classical self-interest ladder (weak -> strict), offering a simple, outcome-agnostic rationale for pruning strategies like B in the motivating 2x2 game.

Keywords: game theory; weak dominance; strict dominance; cross dominance; Pareto-monotone; strategy elimination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-11-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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