Captive Supervisory Regimes

Zygphryd Suñas

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: I develop a simple theory of supervised training under multitask incentives in which participation is valuable independently of completion. When completion-inducing effort is not contractible and supervisors allocate time across competing activities, equilibrium completion effort may be pinned to the minimum required for participation. The model yields two regimes: an alignment regime, where effort is determined by marginal incentives, and a captive regime, where it is pinned by the participation constraint. Comparative statics are regime dependent and can be counterintuitive: higher completion payoffs and participation benefits may reduce effort under a captive regime, while portable benefits and competition can mitigate this distortion by raising outside options. I discuss this mechanism as an explanation for low completion rates and extended time-to-degree in graduate education in developing contexts.

Keywords: multitask incentives; supervision; participation constraints; graduate completion; higher education; human capital; development (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 D86 M5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-04-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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