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Dynamic Efficiency without Increasing Returns: Intertemporal Externalities in Competitive Economies

Jaspal Singh

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper develops a theory of dynamic inefficiency in a competitive economy with intertemporal externalities arising from structural accumulation. Current output enhances future productive capacity, but firms fail to internalise this effect, generating a wedge between private and social returns to output. This missing intertemporal component of marginal returns is captured by a positive dynamic efficiency wedge. As a result, the competitive equilibrium is dynamically inefficient, with output systematically below the level consistent with intertemporal optimality. The inefficiency arises under concave technologies and does not rely on increasing returns, non-convexities, or market power. The paper further shows that the optimal allocation can be decentralised through an output-contingent subsidy that internalises the dynamic efficiency wedge. The resulting policy is self-financing in present value while respecting a wage constraint, yielding an implementation that is both efficient and institutionally robust.

Keywords: Dynamic inefficiency; Intertemporal externality; Structural accumulation; Dynamic efficiency wedge; Output determination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D24 D62 O41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-04-15
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