Designing Donor Registries: Behavioral Drivers of Enrollment and Giving

Matej Lorko, Maroš Servátka and Robert Slonim

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Many charitable organizations invite potential donors to first join a registry before soliciting donations from those who have joined. Behavioral theories suggest that the choice architecture of registry enrollment can influence not just participation but also future giving. Some approaches may be relatively more likely to increase the likelihood of joining but reduce the subsequent propensity to donate and the amount donated, while other methods might have the opposite effect. We experimentally test four behavioral theories – overhead aversion, status quo bias, reciprocity, and moral consistency – in a two-stage donor engagement model. We find that (1) disclosing registry-related overhead costs decreases donations, (2) changing the default enrollment method (op-in vs. opt-out) does not affect enrollment nor donations, (3) targeting reciprocity by offering a small gift conditional on joining the registry boosts enrollment but not donations, and (4) targeting moral consistency by requesting an upfront contribution does not decrease the likelihood of joining the registry and can improve charity returns. Our findings emphasize how subtle differences in the design of early-stage donor approaches can influence longer-term fundraising outcomes.

Keywords: charitable giving; donor registry; overhead aversion; status quo bias; reciprocity; moral consistency; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D47 D64 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-05-21
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:129222

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