A Note on Pollution Cleanup Investments, Signaling, Ganges River Resilience, and Lessons for Europe

Amitrajeet Batabyal

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We study pollution cleanup investments, signaling, and the resilience of the Ganges river when investors differ in capability and cleanup projects differ in their ability to enhance resilience. First, we derive the minimal level of signaling necessary to sustain a separating equilibrium in which the government agency can distinguish between more and less capable investors. Larger cleanup efforts require greater signaling, although the marginal increase in signaling declines as the scale of cleanup expands. Second, we analyze the benchmark case in which signaling is impossible. Here, more and less capable investors choose the more resilience enhancing cleanup projects because the expected payment from these projects is larger than the payment from less resilience enhancing projects. Hence, eliminating signaling raises investor welfare and encourages projects that are more beneficial for the resilience of the Ganges.

Keywords: Ganges River; Investment; Pollution Cleanup; Resilience; Signaling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 Q53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-04-03, Revised 2026-05-17
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/129356/1/MPRA_paper_129356.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:129356

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().