Социализм в отдельно взятой стране: структурные дефекты и распад СССР

Socialism in One Country: Structural Defects and the Break-up of the USSR

Denis Khramov

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The USSR did not collapse from any single trigger but from the interaction of two structural defects rooted in its founding choice — building socialism in one country by command rather than market. First, administrative pricing left the economy unable to measure its own internal flows: the question of who subsidized whom has no ruler-independent answer and flips sign between domestic and world prices. Second, the ethno-territorial design — fixed by the 1922 Union Treaty and the 1924 Constitution — embedded nations in bordered republics with the right to exit. Drawing on three independent transfer computations (world-price recalculation, budget transfers, long-run capital flows) and the recovered primary Goskomstat 1988 world-price recalculation, the paper shows the RSFSR was the net donor in world prices and in the budget yet roughly balanced in raw domestic prices — its apparent domestic deficit is entirely a foreign-trade artifact of underpriced energy exports that reverses sign under world pricing. The donor direction is robust; its magnitude is an artifact of non-market pricing, and the same measurement defect extends beyond Soviet borders. The dissolution is presented as a structural consequence of the founding choice — an explanatory model, not a theorem. Data and code are open.

Keywords: распад СССР; командная экономика; централизованное планирование; спор о социалистическом расчёте; административные цены; искажения относительных цен; межреспубликанские трансферты; мировые цены; межотраслевой баланс; этнофедерализм; право выхода; энергетические субсидии; СЭВ; кто кого субсидировал; Госкомстат (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B53 F14 F54 H77 N14 N44 P21 P22 P51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-06-18
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