How to Reform the Italian Domestic Adoptions System Through a Centralized Market Design

Tommaso Reggiani

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Using an innovative variation of the standard Matching Market Design framework, this draft aims to provide inputs useful to drive the reform of the current Italian Domestic Adoption System (Italian families that desire to adopt an Italian child). The problem addressed in this draft, concern how to match the relative small number of waiting children to the large number of waiting families in the most rational and efficient way: each year, the adoptions system is not able to place the 20% of the children in foster care, despite the fact that the number of children (supply side) is very small respect the total amount of families (demand side) willing to adopt. This project is oriented to solve the inefficiencies characterizing the current adoption program, substituting the actual decentralized setup with a more efficient centralized matching market criteria

Keywords: Matching Market Design; Adoptions System; Matching Algorithm (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-04-30
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:16294

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