Coping with Externalities in Tourism - A Dynamic Optimal Taxation Approach

Stefan Schubert

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The paper studies optimal taxation (subvention) when tourism is associated with „multiple externalities“, using a simple dynamic model of a small open economy, which is completely specialized in the production of tourism services and populated by a large number of intertemporally optimizing agents. Depending on the volume of tourism production, the externality can be either positive or negative. We show that the first best optimum, achieved by a central planner, recognizing the externality, can be replicated in a decentralized economy by using a time-varying tax rate. This ensures that (i) the steady state of the first best optimum is reached and that (ii) the speed of convergence to steady state is socially optimal.

Keywords: tourism demand; externalities; dynamic optimal taxation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F21 H21 H23 R13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-pbe and nep-tur
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/16736/1/MPRA_paper_16736.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Coping with Externalities in Tourism: A Dynamic Optimal Taxation Approach (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:16736

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().