Allocation of objects with conditional property rights

Antonio Quesada

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper considers the allocation of indivisible goods among members of a collective assuming that individuals are given the right to retain certain goods when some individuals alter the allocation problem. The assignment of rights is exhaustive in that, for every good x, either individual i can exercise a right over x against j or j against i. It is shown that the only Pareto efficient allocation rules satisfying these requirements are those having a hierarchy of diarchies.

Keywords: Allocation rule; hierarchy of diarchies; indivisible good; property right. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D61 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-12-20
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:19469

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