Taxes, lawyers, and the decline of witch trials in France

Noel Johnson () and Mark Koyama

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper explores the rise of the fiscal state in the early modern period and its impact on legal capacity. To measure legal capacity, we establish that witchcraft trials were more likely to take place where the central state had weak legal insti- tutions. Combining data on the geographic distribution of witchcraft trials with unique panel data on tax receipts across 21 French regions, we find that the rise of the tax state can account for much of the decline in witch trials during this period. Further historical evidence supports our hypothesis that higher taxes led to better legal institutions.

Keywords: Rule of Law; Witchcraft; France; Institutions; Fiscal Capacity; Legal Capacity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H2 K0 K14 N43 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-10-21
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cis, nep-his and nep-law
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Taxes, Lawyers, and the Decline of Witch Trials in France (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:34266

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