Effects of groups and government size on information disclosure

Eiji Yamamura ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper uses data from Japan to ascertain the determinants of government information disclosures by considering the role of special interest groups and government size. A IV-Tobit model is employed to control for endogeneity bias of government size. The major findings are as follows: (1) special interest groups have a detrimental effect on information disclosure; (2) special interest groups and an aging population increase government size; and (3) information disclosure ordinances are more likely to be enacted with a large government size.

Keywords: pecial interest group; Government size; Information-disclosure ordinance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G38 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-01-22
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:36141

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