Institutional interactions and economic growth: The joint effects of property rights, veto players and democratic capital

Mogens K. Justesen and Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We investigate the possible interaction effects that the extent of property rights protection and separation of powers in a political system have on economic growth. Using analysis of panel data from more than countries over the period 1970-2010 we find that the growth effects of property rights increase when political power is divided among more veto players. When distinguishing between institutional veto players (political institutions) and partisan veto players (fractionalization among political parties), we further find that the growth effects of property rights are driven mainly by checks on the chief executive (in bicameral systems) and primarily found in countries with large stocks of democratic capital.

Keywords: Economic growth; institutions; property rights; veto players; democracy. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 E02 O17 O43 P14 P16 P17 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-fdg and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

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Journal Article: Institutional interactions and economic growth: the joint effects of property rights, veto players and democratic capital (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:51773

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