Categorization and correlation in a random-matching game

Yaron Azrieli

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We consider a random-matching model in which every agent has a categorization (partition) of his potential opponents. In equilibrium, the strategy of each player is a best response to the distribution of actions of his opponents in each category of his categorization. We provide equivalence theorems between distributions generated by equilibrium profiles and correlated equilibria of the underlying game.

Keywords: Random-matching game; Categorization; Correlated equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-10-25
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Categorization and correlation in a random-matching game (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:5475

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