A convergence result for a bargaining set

Javier Hervés-Estévez and Emma Moreno-García

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We introduce a new notion of bargaining set for finite economies and show a convergence result.

Keywords: Bargaining set; coalitions; core; veto mechanism; justified objections. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D00 D11 D51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:69813

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