 The Themistocles Naval Decree of 483/2 BCE and the Greek Referendum of 2015: A comparative analysis of choice set under direct democracy proceduresEmmanouil-Marios-Lazaros Economou (), Nicholas Kyriazis and Theodore Metaxas MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Abstract: In the present essay we examine decision-making and choice under direct democracy procedures, focusing on two famous examples: Themistocles’ Naval Law of 483/2 BCE and modern Greece’s referendum of June 2015. They concerned, in a broad sense, the choice between the finance of public good(s) versus the increase in available personal income. We analyse the similarities and differences in the institutional setting, the means available for discussion and consensus building and the actual outcomes, which were different: in ancient Athens the outcome was in favour of the “public good” defense and in modern Greece, it was of no consequence since the final actual outcome was contrary to the referendum. Lastly, we offer some thoughts regarding the different outcomes, which were dependent on the specific perceptions of each issue, the possibility of disaggregation of choice elements, the time horizon and historic context and the perception of citizens-voters, as to the “quality” of their government. Keywords: Themistocles’ Naval Law; Greece’s referendum of June 2015; decision making; consensus building (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:76421 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC. |
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