Manipulations and repeated games in future markets

Graciela Chichilnisky

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This chapter analyzes the possibility of manipulation in futures markets, concentrating on the effects that manipulation may have on their informational efficiency . We use the concept of manipulation as it arises in the study of noncooperative games with imperfect information . The problem can be summarized as follows : disclosure that is, (less anonymity) may prevent manipulation and therefore improve the informational efficiency of the market . On the other hand, disclosure (less anonymity) may restrict entry, and therefore produce an efficiency loss. There is, in this sense, a tradeoff between informational efficiency and free entry.

Keywords: futures; efficiency; futures markets; games; game theory; manipulation; imperfect information; disclosure; repeated games; one-shot game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 G13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1984
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Published in The Industrial Organization of Futures Markets (1984): pp. 193-214

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