 Nonparametric identification of dynamic multinomial choice games: unknown payoffs and shocks without interchangeabilityKarina V. Otero MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Abstract: This paper proves a nonparametric identification result for a stochastic dynamic discrete choice game of incomplete information. The joint distribution of the private information and the stage game payoffs of the players are both assumed unknown for the econometrician and the private information across alternatives is allowed to have different distributions and be dependent. This setup poses a circularity problem in the identification strategy that has not been solved for dynamic games. This paper proposes a solution through exclusion restrictions and implied properties of the unknown functions. Under the assumptions that the distribution of the private shocks for the outside option is known and the outside option’s shocks are independent of other shocks, the results jointly identify the stage game payoffs and the joint distribution of the private information. Keywords: dynamic multinomial choice games; dynamic Markov game; Markov decision processes; multiple choice models; econometric identification; incomplete information; dynamic discrete choice; discrete decision process; decision model. (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:86784 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC. |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to econpapers@oru.se.
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.