Minority ownership, deferral, perverse intrafirm trade and tariffs

Chander Kant

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: When the foreign subsidiary has minority local ownership and the MNF engages in transfer pricing, its intrafirm exports are always from the country with the higher marginal cost. Further, permitting deferral from home taxation of non-repatriated foreign profits changes the nature of intrafirm trade from efficient to perverse even when the foreign subsidiary is fully-owned by the MNF. Intrafirm trade differs significantly from that between unrelated buyers and sellers, and tariffs on such trade (when it is perverse) can restore global production efficiency.

Keywords: Transfer pricing; Deferral from home taxation of non-repatriated foreign profits; Exporting from higher marginal cost country (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F1 F12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1995
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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