Optimal dynamic antitrust fines

Carlos Merino Troncoso

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Standard antitrust optimal fines rely on a microeconomic static model. Motchenkova describes optimal antitrust dynamic sanctions and their application for EU and US methodology. For the EU fine, and based on this methodology, we find an equilibrium point for a high level of offense (2 times normal profits ) and a high detection probability (0.6).

Keywords: antitrust; cartel; differential games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 L4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-11-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth, nep-ind and nep-ore
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:96781

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