External Sponsorship and Counter-Terrorism

Aditya Bhan and Tarun Kabiraj

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We consider interaction of two terror outfits and study possible counter-terrorism (CT) measures, both in the absence and presence of external terror finance. In our paper, external sponsorship with proportional allocation rule, induces strategic interaction and incentivizes more attacks. We provide a theoretical foundation for the ubiquity of defensive counter-terrorism (CT) versus the limited applicability of offensive measures and confidence-building measures (CBMs). Curtailing external sponsorship is always effective in inhibiting terror activity. In fact, targeting external funding may be the most effective CT tool if terror activity is sufficiently low. While CBMs may be more effective in the absence of external sponsorship, defensive CT may be preferable in its presence. However, CBMs may not be as effective in the presence of external sponsorship, as in its absence.

Keywords: Terror outfit; counter-terrorism; external sponsorship; defensive, offensive and confidence building measures. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D62 D74 F52 H89 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-08-20, Revised 2019-12-31
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:98361

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