Corporate governance and residual state property (two qualitative shortcomings of privatization in transition countries)

Wladimir Andreff

Prague Economic Papers, 2000, vol. 2000, issue 1

Abstract: The privatization in transition countries generated distorsions. Among the most dangerous distorsions are those introduced by a non legal or criminal privatization of management with the help of former or new informal networks connecting managers to the irregular economy and to some extent to the mafia. State regulation is required to control again monopoly power in privatized utilities and sectors where private stakes have won privileged position. It should be better to recognize the unavoidable role of the state in economic restructuring and use its intervention as a complementary - rather than an antagonistic - tool of the economic transition.

Keywords: privatization; corporate governance; transition countries; state regulation; criminal or non legal activities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://pep.vse.cz/doi/10.18267/j.pep.61.html (text/html)
free of charge

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:prg:jnlpep:v:2000:y:2000:i:1:id:61

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Editorial office Prague Economic Papers, University of Economics, nám. W. Churchilla 4, 130 67 Praha 3, Czech Republic
http://pep.vse.cz

DOI: 10.18267/j.pep.61

Access Statistics for this article

Prague Economic Papers is currently edited by Klára Pavlová

More articles in Prague Economic Papers from Prague University of Economics and Business Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Stanislav Vojir ().