Corruption and China's Economic Reform in the Early 21st Century

Gregory Chow
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Gregory Chow: Princeton University

No 86, Working Papers from Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies.

Abstract: Past economic reform of the state sector in China consisted mainly of privatization, of agriculture and of small and medium-size state enterprises, leaving large state enterprises in the control of the state. Current reform consists of making state-owned enterprises and banks more efficient and functioning like private enterprises, and gradual privatization of some large state enterprises. Bureaucrats managing state assets and the selling of assets take advantage of such power to benefit themselves, including embezzlement of public funds and taking bribes from citizens needing their help, as can be found in state enterprises, state-owned commercial banks and in government projects. Reducing the size of the government sector is a basic solution to the corruption problem in China while attention should be paid in the privatization process which can involve corruption.

Keywords: China; SOE; state owned enterprise (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 K42 L32 L33 P21 P31 P37 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-10
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pri:cepsud:116

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