The Robustness of Robust Implementation

Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn and Stephen Morris
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Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn: Princeton University

No 1252, Working Papers from Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program.

Abstract: We show that a mechanism that robustly implements optimal outcomes in a one-dimensional supermodular environment continues to robustly implement e-optimal outcomes in all close-by environments. Robust implementation of e-outcomes is thus robust to small perturbations of the environment. This is in contrast to ex-post implementation which is not robust in this sense as only trivial social choice functions are ex-post implementable in generic environments.

Keywords: robust implementation; social choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C01 D40 E20 H30 O40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-06
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Related works:
Chapter: The Robustness of Robust Implementation (2012)
Journal Article: The robustness of robust implementation (2011)
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