Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for ! ! 1 and a Folk Theorem

Johannes Hörner, Takuo Sugaya, Satoru Takahashi and Nicolas Vieille ()
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Takuo Sugaya: Princeton University

No 1264, Working Papers from Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program.

Abstract: We present an algorithm to compute the set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs as the discount factor tends to one for stochastic games with observable states and public (but not necessarily perfect) monitoring when the limiting set of (long-run players?) equilibrium payoffs is independent of the initial state. This is the case, for instance, if the Markov chain induced by any Markov strategy profile is irreducible. We then provide conditions under which a folk theorem obtains: if in each state the joint distribution over the public signal and next period?s state satisfies some rank condition, every feasible payoff vector above the minmax payoff is sustained by a perfect public equilibrium with low discounting.

Keywords: stochastic; games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for - 1 and a Folk Theorem (2010)
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