Is the 50-State Strategy Optimal?

Dan Kovenock and Brian Roberson

Purdue University Economics Working Papers from Purdue University, Department of Economics

Abstract: In 2005, the Democratic National Committee adopted the 50-state strategy in lieu of the strategy of focusing solely on battleground states. The rationale given for this move is that campaign expenditures are durable outlays that impact both current and future campaigns. This paper investigates the optimality of the 50-state strategy in a simple dynamic game of campaign resource allocation in which expenditures act as a form of investment. Neither the 50-state nor the battleground-states strategy is likely to arise in equilibrium. Instead, parties employ a modified battleground-states strategy in which they stochastically target non-battleground states.

Keywords: Political Campaigns; Dynamic Contests; Elections; All-Pay Auction; War of Attrition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2008-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Is the 50-State Strategy Optimal? (2009)
Working Paper: Is the 50-state strategy optimal? (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pur:prukra:1211

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