Asymmetric Conflicts with Endogenous Dimensionality

Dan Kovenock, Michael J. Mauboussin and Brian Roberson

Purdue University Economics Working Papers from Purdue University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This article examines a two-stage model of asymmetric conflict based on the classic Colonel Blotto game in which players have, in the first stage, the ability to increase the number of battlefields contested. It thereby endogenizes the dimensionality of conflict. In equilibrium, if the asymmetry in the players resource endowments exceeds a threshold, the weak player chooses to add battlefields, while the strong player never does. Adding battlefields spreads the strong player s forces more thinly, increasing the incidence of favorable strategic mismatches for the weak player.

Keywords: Asymmetric Conflict; Multi-battle Conflict; Colonel Blotto Game; Stochastic Guerilla Warfare; Endogenous Dimensionality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2010-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Journal Article: Asymmetric Conflicts with Endogenous Dimensionality (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pur:prukra:1259

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