Cooperation under the Shadow of Political Inequality

Yaroslav Rosokha, Xinxin Lyu, Denis Tverskoi and Sergey Gavrilets

Purdue University Economics Working Papers from Purdue University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We study cooperation among individuals and groups facing a dynamic social dilemma in which the benefits of cooperation are divided according to political power obtained in a contest. The main theoretical and experimental results focus on the role of the incumbency advantage. Specifically, an incumbency advantage in the political contest leads to a rapid breakdown of cooperation in the social dilemma. In addition, we investigate whether groups behave differently than individuals and provide simulations based on the individual evolutionary learning model of Arifovic and Ledyard (2012) to shed light on the difference observed in the experiment.

Keywords: Dynamic Games; Cooperation; Coordination; Contest; Experiments; Group Decision Making (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 C92 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 67 pages
Date: 2024-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pur:prukra:1350

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