Does Federalism Matter? Political Choice in a Federal Republic

Susan Rose-Ackerman

Working Paper from Economics Department, Queen's University

Abstract: This paper builds upon some well-known facts about state government to generate new conclusions about social choice on the national level of a federal republic. It analyzes national legislative choices in a federal system under various assumptions about the nature of politics and the options available to voters. Citizens vote against national laws that restrict their state's ability to export costs but support laws that reduce the costs imposed on them. Individuals may seek to extend the laws passed in some states to the entire nation, or may oppose preemptive laws because they benefit from variety. Since these motivations are absent in a unitary system, national support for a law will depend upon whether a unitary or a federal structure prevails.

Pages: 44
Date: 1978
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qed:wpaper:306

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