Intergovernmental Transfers and Pareto Optimality

David Allan Vardy
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David Allan Vardy: Queen's University

No 38, Working Paper from Economics Department, Queen's University

Abstract: This paper will examine a variety of models in which the affected governments modify their behavior in response to spillover benefits. Initiallly, governments will adjust to the 'income effects' of benefit spill-ins, but it will be shown that intergovernmental compensation will generally be required in order to achieve Pareto optimality.

Pages: 45 pages
Date: 1972-03
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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http://qed.econ.queensu.ca/working_papers/papers/qed_wp_38.pdf First version 1972 (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qed:wpaper:38

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