A Model of Retiree Demand for Life-Insured Annuities and Policy When Markets Fail and Optimal Public Provision is not Feasible

Peter G.C. Townley

Working Paper from Economics Department, Queen's University

Abstract: Individuals beginning a retirement of uncertain duration are assumed to posses better information about their life expectancy then either private sector insurers or government. When this type of asymmetric information exists, a competitive equilibria in annuity markets will be inefficient. Government can operate an optimal compulsory annuity plan if certain conditions are satisfied. If not, an alternative is to operate a public annuity plan on a voluntary basis.

Pages: 45 pages
Date: 1988
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qed:wpaper:720

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