Alliances and Negotiations

Paola Manzini and Marco Mariotti

No 424, Working Papers from Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance

Abstract: A characteristic of many bargaining situations is that the negotiators represents the interests of a set of parties (trade unions, political parties, etc.) with composite interests, whose bargaining behaviour is regulated by some collective decision mechanism. In this paper we provide a natural model of such circumstances, and show how different preference aggregation procedures within the composite player affect the bargaining outcome. In particular we find that unanimity procedures lead to `more aggressive' behaviour than majority procedures, and that procedures which introduce minimum safeguards for the members of an alliance may result in agreements that are worse than without those safeguards.

Keywords: Alliances; Multiperson bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D1 D2 D3 D4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-11-01
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Journal Article: Alliances and negotiations (2005)
Working Paper: Alliances and Negotiations (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:424

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