Trust in Central Banks

Michael Ehrmann

RBA Annual Conference Papers from Reserve Bank of Australia

Abstract: Trust in the central bank is an essential ingredient for a successful conduct of monetary policy. However, for many central banks trust has recently declined, for instance in the wake of the post-pandemic inflation surge, due to large errors in central banks’ inflation forecasts, or given problems when exiting from forward guidance. The rapid, substantial and persistent erosion of trust makes it clear that trust needs to be earned continuously. This paper reviews why trust is important, what determines it and how central banks can enhance it. It also argues that it is important for central banks to improve the measurement and monitoring of trust. It ends by highlighting some future challenges for maintaining trust.

Keywords: trust; credibility; reputation; central banks; monetary policy; inflation expectations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-10, Revised 2025-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-for, nep-mon and nep-soc
Note: Paper presented at the RBA's annual conference 'Central Bank Communications', Sydney, 14–15 October 2024.
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Working Paper: Trust in central banks (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rba:rbaacp:acp2024-04

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