Visual and Social Anchoring in a Framed Online Rating Experiment

Yigit Oezcelik and Michel Tolksdorf
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Yigit Oezcelik: University of Liverpool
Michel Tolksdorf: TU Berlin

No 556, Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series from CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition

Abstract: We conduct an online experiment to assess the effect of the anchoring bias on consumer ratings. We depart from the canonical anchoring literature by implementing non-numerical (visual) anchors in a framed rating task. We compare three anchoring conditions, with either high, low, or socially derived anchors present, against two control conditions – one without anchors and one without framing. Our framing replicates the common observation of overrating. We unveil asymmetric non-numerical anchoring effects that contribute to the explanation of overrating. Both high anchors and socially derived anchors lead to significant overrating compared to the control condition without anchors. The latter finding is driven by instances of high social anchors. The upward rating bias is exacerbated in a social context, where participants exhibit more trust in anchors. In contrast, low anchors and instances of low social anchors have no effect compared to the control condition without anchors. Beyond consumer ratings, our results may have broader implications for online judgment environments, such as surveys, crowdfunding platforms, and other user interfaces that employ visual indicators such as stars, bars, or progress displays.

Keywords: anchoring bias; consumer judgment; economic experiment; online feedback systems; user interface design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D80 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-12-22
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