Delegating in the Age of AI: Preferences for Decision Autonomy

Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel and Michel Tolksdorf
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Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel: TU Berlin
Michel Tolksdorf: TU Berlin

No 558, Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series from CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition

Abstract: Despite the documented benefits of algorithmic decision-making, individuals often prefer to retain control rather than delegate decisions to AI agents. To what extent are the aversion to and distrust of algorithms rooted in a fundamental discomfort with giving up decision authority? Using two incentivized laboratory experiments across distinct decision domains, hiring (social decision-making) and forecasting (analytical decision-making), and decision architecture (nature and number of decisions), we elicit participants’ willingness to delegate decisions separately to an AI agent and a human agent. This within-subject design enables a direct comparison of delegation preferences across different agent types. We find that participants consistently underutilize both agents, even when informed of the agents’ superior performance. However, participants are more willing to delegate to the AI agent than to the human agent. Our results suggest that algorithm aversion may be driven less by distrust in AI and more by a general preference for decision autonomy. This implies that efforts to increase algorithm adoption should address broader concerns about control, rather than focusing solely on trust-building interventions.

Keywords: algorithm; delegation; artificial intelligence; trust in ai; experiment; preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D44 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-12-22
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