Dictator Giving When Recipients Can Opt Out

Diya Abraham () and Ondrej Krcal ()
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Diya Abraham: Department of Economics, University of Reading
Ondrej Krcal: Department of Economics, Masaryk University, Brno

No em-dp2026-06, Economics Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of Reading

Abstract: Participants' willingness to give in the dictator game has been found to be very sensitive to extending their choice set so that they can also take from recipients. To reduce this choice-set effect, we make the game less abstract by permitting potential recipients to opt out of it. Across four treatments, we vary whether taking is permitted and whether recipients can opt out of the game. Results suggest that while the choice-set effect is replicated when recipients cannot opt out, it plays less of a role when recipients enter the game voluntarily. We rule out a competing reciprocity-based explanation for this result, and conclude that the modified opt-in dictator game may provide a less sensitive measure of other-regarding preferences.

Keywords: altruism; dictator game; distributional preferences; vulnerability; intentions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C90 D91 J24 M54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2026-06-22
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