Should unemployment insurance be asset-tested?

Sebastian Koehne and Moritz Kuhn

Review of Economic Dynamics, 2015, vol. 18, issue 3, 575-592

Abstract: We study asset-tested unemployment insurance in an incomplete markets model with moral hazard during job search. Optimal asset testing is weak and yields negligible welfare gains. The optimal replacement rate of an unemployed worker with zero liquidity is 9 percentage points higher than that of the median worker. Welfare rises by 0.03 percent in consumption equivalent terms. We develop a general welfare decomposition for heterogeneous agent models with transitional dynamics. Asset testing creates welfare gains due to redistribution and additional consumption during the transition phase, and welfare losses due to reduced consumption smoothing, lower consumption, and higher effort levels. (Copyright: Elsevier)

Keywords: Unemployment insurance; Asset testing; Incomplete markets; Welfare decomposition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E21 E24 J65 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Should Unemployment Insurance be Asset-Tested (2013)
Working Paper: Should Unemployment Insurance Be Asset-Tested? (2013)
Working Paper: Should unemployment insurance be asset-tested? (2012)
Working Paper: Should unemployment insurance be asset-tested? (2012)
Working Paper: Should unemployment insurance be asset-tested? (2012)
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DOI: 10.1016/j.red.2014.09.005

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