A Refinement of Sequential Equilibrium with Application to Decentralized Collusion

James Schummer and Peter Eso ()

No 483, 2004 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: We provide a new equilibrium-refinement (a generalization of the Intuitive Criterion) for dynamic incomplete information games. We discuss the properties of this refinement in a class of games that includes sender-receiver games. We also provide applications (certain incomplete information games where collusion may be initiated in a decentralized way) where our predictions differ from those based on other standard refinements

Keywords: equilibrium refinement; collusion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C73 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed004:483

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